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Abstract  
This paper develops and tests a conceptual model of supplier selection decisions in the public 
sector. The study seeks to determine the relative importance of a broad range of non-economic 
variables in explaining supplier selection decisions during strategic organizational purchases. Data 
were collected from a national sample of 341 senior staff and top management team (TMT) 
members in 40 public sector organizations in Nigeria using structured questionnaires. Results of 
structural equation modelling (SEM) analysis shows that government policy requirements, social 
ties of organizational actors, party politics, decision-makers’ experience, and the perception of 
instrumental ethical work climates are, respectively, the most important determinants of strategic 
supplier selection decisions, followed in descending order of importance by: the perception of rules 
ethical work climates, self-enhancement personal values, CEOs’ structural position, self-
transcendent personal values and the perception of time pressure. Findings also indicate that the 
choice of a supplier per se is not an important determinant of organizational performance. 
 
Key words: Public Sector, supplier selection decisions, behavioral and non-economic 
determinants. 
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Antecedents of Supplier Selection Decisions in the Public Sector in Nigeria 
 
Organizational buying decisions are mainly modeled and explained using rational 
economic theory of the firm, thus assuming that firms will always be objective (or apply rational 
criteria) when selecting suppliers during important purchase decisions (Wilkinson & Young, 
2013). Hence, industrial marketing research has focused on the so-called ‘rational variables’ such 
as price, quality, delivery time, and others, with little or no emphasis on the behavioral and non-
economic factors influencing organizational purchasing decisions (Iyer, Xiao, Sharma & 
Nicholson, 2015; Flynn & Davies, 2014; Hadjikhani & LaPlaca, 2013; Ariely, 2009; Tullous & 
Munson, 1992). However, an emerging stream of empirical studies, starting from the 1970s, have 
challenged the notion of organizational rationality, demonstrating that organizations (like 
individuals) are not always rational when making choices (Iyer et al., 2015; Augier, 2013; Van De 
Ven & Lifchitz, 2013; Hadjikhani & Laplaca, 2013; Ariely, 2009).  
These emerging studies, which are largely based on behavioral theory of the firm and 
bounded rationality theory, are attempts at providing explanations as to why seemingly ‘irrational’ 
decision-making occurs in organizations (Iyer et al., 2015; Van De Ven & Lifchitz, 201). 
Moreover, while transactional economic theory is based largely on the behavior of manufacturing 
and commercial organizations, other forms of organization are given very little consideration 
(Flynn & Davis, 2014; Ozmen, Oner, Khorowshahi, & Undewood, 2013; Wilson, 2000).  
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With this growing awareness of the shortcomings of rational economic theory of the firm 
in explaining ‘irrational’ organizational actions, several scholars have advocated for the 
development of decision models which use sociological/psychological and non-economic 
variables, because of their robustness in explaining choice behavior (Augier, 2013; Wilkinson & 
Young, 2013; Van De Ven & Lifschitz, 2013; McCue and Peter, 2008; Ho, Lim and Camerer, 
2006; Wilson, 2000). Wilson (2000, p.783) captures the current focus of research when he 
observes that: 
Research into many other forms of organizations is still in relatively early stages, for 
example, with respect to foreign (i.e. with non-western cultures) organizations, SMEs, 
family organizations (i.e., those owned and run by families) service providers, churches, 
arts and leisure organizations, public sector organizations, and other not-for-profit 
organizations. The result is that organizational buyer behavior theory is still dominated by 
a default paradigm of large manufacturing organizations operating primarily in the 
context of western markets and assumed (simplistically and misleadingly} to be driven by 
profit-maximizing objectives. 
Against this background, as well as McCue and Peter’s (2008, p.2) call for the 
intensification of research to enhance the prediction and explanation of the behavior of public 
sector organizations, the current study has two key objectives. First, to develop and empirically 
test a model comprising a broad range of behaviorally-relevant and non-economic factors that may 
explain public sector supplier selection outcomes in a non-western country context. Second, to 
determine the extent to which the supplier selection decisions made by public sector organizations 
influence their performance. This study contributes to the literature by bringing together and 
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testing, in a single model, a broad range of organizational outcome determinants initially proposed 
in isolation by various authors, with a view to assessing their relative importance.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Several forms of non-economic and behaviorally relevant antecedents might provide 
alternative explanations of the decision behavior of organizations. Some of the concepts and 
constructs that have been investigated in empirical studies include: purchase importance; 
familiarity with purchase situations; time pressure; experience; personal stakes; organizational 
size, and degree of formalization (Garrido-Samaniego & Gutiérrez-Cillan, 2004); government 
regulations and policies (Nwakibinga & Buvik, 2013; Qiao, Thai & Cummings, 2009); political 
activities (Khemakhem & Dicko, 2013; You & Du 2012; Bliss & Gul, 2012); personal values of 
decision-makers (Roman, 2014; Suar & Khuntia, 2010; Schwartz, 2006; Connor & Becker, 2003); 
favoritism and political connections (Du et al., 2008); ethics (Simha and Cullen, 2012; Weber, 
1997), and more. In studying these variables, researchers have developed frameworks for 
identifying and categorizing these concepts and constructs (for example, see Garrido-Samaniego 
& Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004; Dawes, Lee, & Dowling, 1998; Wren & Simpson, 1996; Robinson, Faris 
& Wind, 1967; Webster & Wind, 1972; Bonoma & Zaltman, 1978; Sheth, 1973; McQuiston, 1989; 
Lilien & Wong, 1984; Hakansson, 1982).  
This study proposes a causal-explanatory model in which external environmental factors 
(government policies and party politics) interact with internal organizational factors 
(organizational ethical work climates and CEOs' structural positions), social elements (the 
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perception of time pressure and social ties) and the personal characteristics of organizational actors 
(personal values and experience) to influence strategic supplier selection decisions in public sector 
organizations. Furthermore, the current model extends the Webster and Wind (1972) framework 
by proposing that the decision to select one vendor rather than another may impact on relative 
organizational performance. The proposed model (figure 1) considers these variables as some of 
the most important factors that come to play in public sector organizations when deciding who 
gets selected as contractor during strategic purchase decisions. Although the work of Webster and 
Wind (1972) serves as the primary basis for the development of this model, the works of several 
other scholars including Kobhi (1989), Dawes et al. (1992) and Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-
Cillan (2004), provided the theoretical rationale for specifying this model. In so doing, a broad 
range of factors is brought together and tested in a single model.    
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Environmental Determinants 
Government policies. Compliance and adherence to institutionalized procurement rules 
and procedures are key prerequisites buyers are expected to meet (Nwakibinga & Buvik, 2013). 
Government buying policies serve as guiding frameworks to align decision-making processes with 
intended objectives. These objectives could range from mitigation of corrupt practices (Nijboer et 
al., 2017; Lindskog, Brege, & Brehmer, 2010), to encouraging sustainable procurement practices 
and innovations (Nijboer, Senden, & Telgen, 2017; Akenroye, 2013; Rao & Holt, 2005), to 
protecting local entrepreneurial production capacity (Bremmer & Walker, 2011; Qiao et al., 2009). 
To this end, government policies are, essentially, control mechanisms meant to ensure that 
organizational actors act in certain ways or within certain bounds (Kobhi, 1989). 
 The influence of government policies come to bear on organizational buying behavior in 
many ways. Some of these ways include providing general and specific guidelines as to when to 
purchase, who does the purchasing, from whom to purchase, and how to purchase. For example, 
Qiao et al., (2009) report cases in the United States of America where ‘preferential treatment’ 
policies are used by governments at different levels to restrict the purchase of certain types of 
products from certain regions.  These cases are not dissimilar to the intent of South Africa’s 
Affirmative Action policy (Kruger, 2013), or Malaysia’s Bumiputera policy (Akenroye, 2013) or, 
indeed, Nigeria’s ‘due process’ and 'local content’ policies (Nwapi, 2015; Achua, 2011; Oguonu, 
2005). 
The literature on government procurement largely suggests that buying and supplying 
decisions are generally guided by strict rules (Nijboer et al., 2017; Mbago, Ntayi, & Muwezi, 2016; 
Lindskog et al., 2010). These ‘strict rules’ accurately describe the ‘rule climate’ and ‘law and code 
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climate’ often associated with public sector organizations (Simha & Cullen, 2012; Agarwal, 2010; 
Wimbush, Shepard, & Markham, 1997). 'Rules climate' describes organizations where decisions 
are “perceived as being guided by a strong and pervasive set of local rules or standards, such as 
codes of conduct” (Simha & Cullen 2012, p. 22). 'Law and code climate' is associated with the 
perception that “decision-making is based on external codes such as the law, the Bible, or 
professional codes of conduct” (Simha & Cullen, 2012, p. 22). These rules and regulations are put 
in place to mitigate the conflicts of interest that often characterize public procurement activities 
(Woodside, Cheng, & Chang, 2012; Kennedy & Cannon, 2004). This is not unexpected, because 
the supplier evaluation and selection process is such that it can promote unethical behavior because 
of the coming together of buyers and sellers to negotiate (both formally and informally) to arrive 
at agreeable deals for their firms (Osisioma, 2001; Tanzi, 1998). 
In view of the foregoing discussions, the following hypotheses are put forward to be tested: 
H1: The width of government procurement policies influences positively: a) strategic 
supplier selection decisions; b) the perception that public sector buying decisions are made within 
the purview of strict rules. 
 Party politics. Given that “politics is one of the determinants of a country’s institutional 
landscape” (Khemakhem & Dicko, 2013, p.118), it is only logical to think that its influence would 
be felt in the business environment. Indeed, several studies point to the influence of political 
activities on organizational processes and outcomes (You & Du, 2013; Khemakhem & Dicko, 
2013; Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011; Faccio, 2007; Peng & Luo, 2000). Such influences are expected 
because of the embedded ties between government and public sector firms (Flynn & Davis, 2014; 
Woodside et al., 2012; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2011). 
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The mention of politics or party politics usually conjures a negative picture or impression 
in the mind of the public. This is not unconnected with the general perception of politics as being 
“self-seeking …without reference to the common good” (Webster’s New World College 
Dictionary, 2010), and the use of “undue influence” (Weber, 1997) which results in the “misuse 
of power” (Wright, 2004, p.10). However, politics has been reported to have both positive and 
negative effects on organizational processes, depending on the angle from which it is analyzed 
(You & Du, 2012; Faccio, 2010). So, the question here is not whether, there is a relationship 
between party politics and organizational processes/outcome: such a relationship is inevitable 
given the proximate resource dependence ties between public sector establishments and 
government (Roman, 2017; Lindskog et al., 2010). The issue here is verifying the perception that 
the weight attached to political considerations by public sector organizations and their members 
when making supplier evaluation and selection decisions is usually very significant, to the extent 
that it overlooks public interest. This is premised on the observation that ‘politicness’ (the 
subjective and normative interpretation of a work environment as being politicized) shapes 
decision behavior in organizations (Roman, 2017, p.65). Furthermore, Sheng et al.’s (2011, p.3) 
study posit that politicians exhibit “opportunistic behavior” by commanding or obliging firms to 
undertake actions with low social but high private returns. 
It is rarely the case that a clear-cut link between party politics and supplier selection 
decisions can always be established. Findings from relevant studies suggest that party politics 
manifest its influence in organizational processes in such indirect manners as: according 
preferential treatment to ‘politically connected’ members (You & Du, 2012); appointment to 
strategic positions in the organizations (Sun et al., 2011; Li et al., 2008); the promulgation of 
directives and regulations which stipulate what to buy, who does the buying, and which supplier 
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is patronized (Roman, 2014, 2017; Nwakibinga & Buvik, 2013); and so forth. That is, it is the 
affiliation the decision-makers have with political stakeholders and institutions (through their 
network of external informal interpersonal relationships) which accord them power and influence 
in organizational buying decisions. This line of argument is plausible when one considers cases, 
especially in public-sector organizational settings, where important regulatory oversight is relaxed 
(Luo, 2007; Faccio, 2007) and outright collusion between buyers and sellers overlooked (Tanaka 
& Hayashi, 2016) because of the political connections of the individuals involved. 
Furthermore, given the suggestion that organizational actors leverage the capital provided 
by their political connections to secure favorable regulatory oversight (Karahana & Preston, 2013; 
You & Du, 2012), it is not far-fetched to associate the ‘undue’ and ‘self-seeking’ tendencies of 
party politics with the circumvention of rules and the promotion of egoistic considerations during 
important organizational decisions. Self-seeking tendencies in organizational activities are often 
described in terms of instrumental ethical work climates – the shared perception that the work 
environment has norms which promote “ethical decision-making from an egoistic perspective” 
(Simha & Cullen, 2012, p.21). Though often associated more with volatile and competitive private 
sector work environments than with pro-social, pro-welfare organizations like government 
establishments (Agarwal et al., 2010), this study argues that the undue and self-seeking nature of 
party politics will come to bear on public sector organizational activities so much so that it is 
positively linked to instrumental ethical work climates and negatively associated with the 
perception that public sector organizations promote rules-based decision making. This argument 
is premised on institutional theory, which argues that organizations and their members make 
themselves relevant by acting in tandem with the external pressures they face (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Moreover, the perception of public sector organizations as politicized or 
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‘politically-controlled’ work environments will engender the accommodation of conflicting 
interests in procurement decisions (Roman, 2017).  
The above discussion leads us to posit the following hypotheses: 
 H2a: The importance of the role of party politics has a positive impact on strategic supplier 
selection decisions. H2b: The importance of the role of party politics is positively related to the 
social ties cultivated by public sector decision-makers. H2c: The higher the buyer position is 
positively related to the importance of the role of party politics H2d: The importance of the role of 
party politics is negatively related to rules-related ethical work climates. H2e: The importance of 
the role of party politics is positively related to instrumental ethical work climates.  
Social Determinants 
 Time pressure. There are situations when organizations need to make critical decisions 
within a short space of time. The phenomenon is described in the literature as ‘decision under time 
pressure’ (Chong, Ferd, Choi, & Rute, 2011; Garrido-Samaniego & Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004’ Suri 
& Munroe, 2003). Indeed, studies have identified time pressure as a critical variable in explaining 
decision-making behavior (Rice & Trafmow, 2012; Suri & Munroe, 2003). In the specific case of 
organizational buying, Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-Cillan (2004, p.323) describe time 
pressure as “the degree to which buying center members feel under pressure when they have to 
reach a particular decision quickly.”  
 Depending on the country or region of the world they come from, consumers’ time 
orientation has been categorized as either monochromic or polychromic (Xu-Priour et al., 2012; 
Van Everdingen & Waarts, 2003). Monochromic cultures are said to perceive time as a tangible 
resource that can be harnessed and managed to attain set goals (Kotabe & Helsen, 2001). Western 
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European countries, the United States of America and Canada are generally described as being 
highly monochromic in orientation (Van Everdingen & Waarts, 2003; Kotabe & Helsen, 2001). 
Polychromic cultures, on the other hand, have the tendency to disregard or downplay the 
importance of planning and co-coordinating time relative to set goals, because of their general 
perception of time as being an intangible resource that can neither be properly controlled nor 
planned (Van Everdingen & Warts, 2003; Kotabe & Helsen, 2001). Kotabe and Helsen (2001) 
rank Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African countries as highly polychromic cultures. 
 Implicit in the above categorization is the suggestion that countries or regions of the world 
with monochromic values of time are likely to ‘feel’ more time-pressured and to be more organized 
than those with polychromic time orientations. Some evidence from the literature supports this 
conceptualization. Citing the work of Hawes (1980), Gross (1994, p.120) argues that time pressure 
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon varying with respect to groups, place and time. This line of 
argument is supported by the study of Xu-Priour et al. (2012) which found that Chinese consumers 
tilt toward the polychromic side on the time value orientation scale, and they feel relatively less 
time-pressured when shopping offline (compared to when shopping online). Furthermore, Van 
Everdingen and Waarts (2003) also apply this idea of culture-based time orientation to explain 
variations in time pressure perception among consumers in various countries when adopting new 
products. 
 Therefore, against the backdrop of the idea that the degree to which consumers ‘feel’ 
pressured by time is a function of their perception of the value of time (Xu-Priour et al., 2012), 
and the observation by Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-Cillan (2004) that there exists little 
empirical research on the relationship between time pressure and organizational buying behavior, 
the following hypothesis is put forward to be tested: 
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 H3: Time pressure has a negative effect on strategic supplier selection decisions. 
 Social ties. The literature suggests that organizational buying activities are embedded in 
networks of interpersonal, intra-organizational and inter-organizational ties generally described as 
‘social ties’ (Gonzalez et al., 2014; Sheng et al., 2011; Bowler, Dahlstrom, Servers, & Skinner, 
2011; Peng & Luo, 2000). In other words, social ties, by nature, involve the boundary-spanning 
personal and professional relationships cultivated and nurtured by members of buying centers, in 
their capacity both as members of the organization and members of the larger society (Sun et al., 
2011). 
 The multi-dimensional relationships maintained by organizational actors translate into 
social capital which impacts on organizational processes and outcomes (Karahanna & Preston, 
2013; Bowler et al., 2011; Luo, 2007). For example, in their study of the effect of relationship 
managers’ social network ties on the sales performance of some North and South American 
companies, Gonzalez et al. (2014) demonstrate how network overlaps (that is, the concurrence of 
multiple kinds of relations maintained by organizational actors) provide them with important and 
unique ‘insider information’ which influences organizational outcomes. Similarly, the study by 
Kwon and Adler (2014) also suggests that multiple social ties provide goodwill to individuals and 
groups which gives them leverage to influence organizational outcomes. Given the foregoing 
contention, the below hypothesis is put forward to be tested:  
 H4: Social ties of decision-makers positively influence strategic supplier selection 
decisions. 
Organizational Determinants 
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 Position. There are certain managerial positions which, because of their centrality and 
boundary-spanning nature, are imbued with the power to influence organizational processes and 
outcomes (Nath & Mahajan, 2011 Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). Studies of organizational buying 
centers show that participation and influence in buying decisions depend, to a large extent, on the 
decision types and the decision-makers’ position in the organizational hierarchy (Garrido-
Samaniego & Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004; Dawes et al., 1998; McQuiston, 1993). 
 Strategic (important) decisions are the prerogative of organizations’ TMT members 
(Engelen et al., 2013; Garrido-Samaniego & Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). 
What this means is that certain individuals who are strategically placed (because of their position 
in the organizational hierarchy) have greater influence on important decisions (Dawes et al., 1998) 
and the ‘explicit responsibilities’ of the position of chief executive officers (CEOs) provides them 
with the leverage and capacity to significantly influence strategic organizational decision-making 
and outcomes (Engelen, Lackboff, & Schmidt, 2013; Karahanna & Preston, 2013; Nath & 
Mahajan, 2011). The below hypothesis is advanced to be tested in view of the above argument. 
 H5: The buying organization’s CEO’s structural position positively influences the strategic 
supplier selection decisions. 
 Ethical work climate. Organizational ethical work climates describe the shared perception 
of how things are done or ought to be done in the work environment (Raile, 2013; Simha & Cullen, 
2012; Qualis & Puto, 1989). Empirical studies suggest that five types of ethical work climates are 
common (Raile, 2013; Simha & Cullen, 2012): instrumental, independent, caring, rules, and law 
& codes. 
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As a group phenomenon, ethical work climates provide the basis for understanding what 
is permissible and desirable from a collective perspective, and this ‘shared perception’ has been 
shown to be strongly associated with attitudes, actions and behavior in organizations because of 
the role they play in response to ethical issues (Raile, 2013; Arnaud, 2010; Tsai & Huang, 2008). 
The literature documents a variety of positive (for example, see Raile, 2013; Deshphande, Joseph, 
& Shu, 2011) and negative (see Martin & Cullen, 2006) influences associated with organizational 
ethical work climates, depending on whether the shared perception connotes a positive or negative 
motivation. Thus, the actions and reactions to work situations by employees could be gauged by 
the type of ethical work climate prevalent in that work environment (Martin & Cullen, 2006).  
Studies suggest that different types of organizations encourage different ethical climate 
types (Wimbush et al., 1997) and pro-social not-for-profit organizations are likely to encourage 
benevolent climates (including independent and caring climates) compared to pro-profit private 
sector establishments where egoistic interests and competition are encouraged (Agarwal et al., 
2010). Therefore, because public sector buying activities are usually guided by ‘strict' rules 
(Mbago et al., 2016; Andreca, 2016; Lindskog et al., 2010), it is expected that the ‘rules’ climate 
(that is, the perception that organizational decisions and processes are always guided by a set of 
pervasive rules and standard) will prevail in such organizations. The existence of such rules and 
codes should ensure due process and accountability in public procurement. However, given the 
resource-dependence and quid pro quo relationship existing between the political system and 
public sector firms (Khemakhem & Dicko, 2013; You & Du, 2013; Reich, 2009), as well as the 
pervasively negative and self-seeking nature of party politics (Roman, 2017, 2014; Wright, 2004), 
this study posits that supplier selection decisions will be associated with instrumental ethical work 
climates (the shared perception that organizational norms promote egoistic tendencies during 
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decision-making), irrespective of the existence of ‘strict’ rules. Furthermore, given that 
organizational actors use their personal values and beliefs as a basis for making decisions (Roman, 
2017, 2014; Sousa et al., 2003), it is not far-fetched to suggest that the instrumental ethical work 
climates prevalent in ‘politicized’ work environments such as most public sector firms (Roman, 
2017) will be associated with self-enhancing personal values (also defined as the promotion of 
self-seeking tendencies and parochial personal interests). To test these claims, the following 
hypotheses are conjectured: 
H6: Strategic supplier selection decisions are positively influenced by a) instrumental 
ethical work climates and b) rules ethical work climates causally determine supplier selection 
decisions in public sector organizations.  
H6b: Instrumental ethical work climates are positively related to the activation of self-
enhancement personal values by decision makers. 
Individual Determinants 
 Personal values. One fundamental theme that cuts across the literature on values is the 
idea that values shape the behavior of individuals which, in turn, reflects on the way they decide 
or are likely to decide (Roman, 2014; Suar & Khuntia, 2010; Schwartz, 2006; Sousa et al., 2005; 
Connor & Becker, 2003). Most contemporary studies on the influences of personal values largely 
adopt Schwartz’s (1992) value theory (e.g., see Fu et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2008; Sousa et al., 
2003; Connor & Becker, 2003; etc.). Schwartz’s values theory divides individuals’ value-types 
into 10 orientations plotted against two bi-polar axes: (i) openness-to-change (stimulation, 
hedonism and self-direction) versus conservatism (security, conformity and tradition); (ii) self-
enhancement (power and achievement) versus self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence). 
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 Consistent with Fu et al.’s (2010) approach, this study uses the self-enhancement versus 
self-transcendent dimensions of personal values to explain public sector supplier selection 
decisions mainly for the reasons that (i) this value set underscores the desire to strike a balance 
between parochial self-interest and pro-social public interest goals (Suar & Khuntia, 2010; 
Wimbush et al., 1997) and (ii), this value set is generally regarded as ‘higher-order’ values 
compared to the other (Fu et al., 2010; Schwartz, 1992). 
 Public sector organizations, by nature, are established to provide social services at a 
reasonable cost to the public (Lindskog et al., 2010). Unlike private sector firms, they are neither 
driven by profit motives nor subjected to competitive market forces (Lindskog et al., 2010). 
Therefore, it is expected that public sector employees should have or exhibit transcendence values 
if there is to be a ‘fit’ between their decision behavior and the organizations’ espoused pro-social 
objectives (Suar & Khuntia, 2010). However, given the much-reported cases of ethical 
transgression associated with most public procurement exercises (Roman, 2014; Simha & Cullen, 
2012; Achua, 2011; Lindskog et al., 2010), it is not implausible to suggest that self-enhancement 
values dominate self-transcendent values during public sector supplier selection decisions. 
Consistent with this view, Roman (2014, p.455) observes that, though public procurement 
decision-makers may possess and exhibit both elements of values associated with purists and 
brokers, “one of the two interpretations will clearly dominate”. This line of argument may be 
particularly salient in public sector settings where ‘straightforward’ and professional managers 
may find it difficult to act on their values because of ‘political pressures’. In addition, this study 
intends to test Chong et al.’s (2011) proposition which suggests that individuals who are self-
motivated to achieve, dominate situations, show their competence or pursue personal 
ambitions/goals (characteristics often associated with self-enhancement values) are most likely to 
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consider time-pressure conditions as opportunities to prove themselves and gain personal 
gratification. To this end, the following hypotheses are advanced: 
 H7: Strategic supplier selection decisions are positively influenced by a) self-enhancement 
personal values and b) self-transcendent personal values  
 H7a: Time pressure positively influences self-enhancement values during strategic supplier 
selection decisions. 
 Experience. Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-Cillan (2004) contend that very few studies 
on the relationship between experience and strategic supplier selection decisions exist in 
organizational buying literature; they demonstrated that experience levels have a strong positive 
effect on the level of participation and influence in supplier selection decisions for strategic 
products (in this case, the purchase of capital equipment). Their study also found that the effect of 
experience in involvement and influence in routine-type decisions was negligible, thus suggesting 
that experience is relatively more important during strategic buying decisions than routine buying 
decisions.  
 Furthermore, experience accords individuals expertise which enhances their internal 
organization of information in memory as well as providing a repertoire of rules on how to use it 
when the need arises (Rice & Trafmow, 2012; Perkins & Rao, 1990; Kobhi, 1989). In situations 
of insufficient information, experienced managers use their cumulative knowledge of previous 
similar situations as heuristics and cues to make decisions (Balaz et al., 2014; Rice & Trafmow, 
2012; Chong et al., 2011). This means that experienced managers are less likely to shy away from 
making decisions if faced with insufficient information relative to an impending decision.  
 Based on the above premise, the following hypotheses are put forward to be tested: 
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 H8: The level of decision makers’ experience with the purchase situation influences: a) 
positively, their influence in supplier selection decisions in public sector organizations; and b) 
negatively, their perception of time pressure. 
Strategic Buying Decisions and Performance 
 This study is interested in strategic buying decisions (as distinct from routine or 
operational buying decisions). Eisenhardt & Zbaracki (1992, p.25) contend that strategic decisions 
“critically affect organizational health and survival” and they are also “important in terms of the 
action taken, the resources committed, and the precedents that are set”. What this means is that the 
performance and outcomes of organizations, both in the long and short terms, could be explained 
by the strategic choices they make.  
Public sector organizations often pursue multifaceted qualitative objectives which are 
sometimes conflicting and very difficult to measure, unlike private sector firms (Hawke, 2012; 
Aubert & Bourdeau, 2012; Boyne, 2003). To avoid some of these issues, this study adopts the 
‘performance approach’ based on agency theory in examining the impact of public sector 
organizational purchase decisions on their performance (Pestieau, 2009). This approach describes 
a principal-agent relationship, where performance is conceptualized in terms of the extent to which 
the agent (decision-maker or employee) fulfills or attains the goals/objectives assigned by the 
principal (i.e., the state, representing the society) (Pestieau, 2009; Popper & Wilson, 2003). 
 The idea of this approach is to assess efficiency and effectiveness in terms of benchmarks 
or predetermined objectives. For every strategic buying decision, there is an intended objective to 
be achieved. The objectives can be described in terms of the completion of a project within 
budgeted resources (time, money, personnel, etc.), the satisfaction of the public, cost-savings, the 
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reduction of corruption, the satisfaction of political interests, and so on. (Ambaw & Telgen, 2017). 
In this sense, performance is the result of an internal self-assessment or evaluation against 
benchmarks or standards set by a principal (Pestieau, 2009). Hence the performance of 
organizations is as ‘perceived’ by the organization’s members. 
Based on the general idea of ‘performance approach’ and agency theory advocated by 
Pestieau (2012), and consistent with the ‘perceived performance’ approach applied by Choi & 
Poister (2014), we hypothesize that: 
H9: Organizations’ supplier selection decisions positively influence their performance. 
Methodology 
Context of the Study 
Public organizational buying decisions (or procurement) form a complex system which 
comprises a series of varied but interrelated decisions, including (but not limited to) needs 
identification, solicitation for and evaluation of tenders, pre-qualification and selection of 
suppliers, signing and the monitoring of contract execution (Patruccio, Luzzini, & Ronch, 2017). 
This study focuses on one stage of the organizational buying process, namely the supplier selection 
phase. The instrument designed for this study uses specific questions which refer to this stage or 
aspect of the buying decision process. Such questions have been shown to have more advantage 
than global ones with respect to consistency and reliability (Raykov & Calantone, 2013; Dawes et 
al., 1998; Silk & Kalwani, 1982). In determining the time for the strategic purchase decision being 
considered, care is taken not to burden the memory of the participants. Thus, the survey asked 
questions pertaining to strategic purchases 3-5 years prior. This time range falls within the tenure 
lifespan of most chief executive officers and heads of government agencies in Nigeria. Without 
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specifying a product or service, participants were asked to consider a recent situation where their 
organization purchased assets or hired services of strategic importance.  
Measurements and Sampling   
 All the measurement items used were adapted from literature as well as validated measures 
that have been used to assess the same constructs in previous studies. In addition, the instrument 
underwent a 2-step pre-test process where the draft instrument was administered to six PhD 
students and 2 senior public servants in Nigeria who are familiar with the Nigerian system. 
Secondly, it was vetted by 2 senior lecturers in the UK who are experienced in the subject matter. 
The feedback and suggestions from the pre-test groups led to most items being re-worded and the 
initial item pool of 70 being pruned to 61. The survey instrument was subdivided into topical 
themes comprising 5 filter/classification questions and 56 target questions meant to measure 
thirteen (13) constructs; eleven (11) exogenous constructs and two (2) endogenous constructs 
(including the control variable, requisite funding). The instrument was formatted as a structured 
questionnaire where participants are expected to indicate their degree of agreement/disagreement 
with series of statements by ticking the corresponding boxes after each statement. The items were 
all 5-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree (see Appendix 
A for the measurement items and their corresponding codes). In choosing the sampling unit 
for this study, the key informant approach was adopted (Kumar et al., 1993). Fifteen participants 
per organization were selected based on their explicit responsibility on the organizational chart as 
well as their familiarity with their organization’s strategic buying process. In all, the target sample 
comprises 600 senior-level officers and TMT members in 40 federal public sector organizations 
in Nigeria. These organizations are either listed in the Schedule to the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(2007) or created by Acts of Parliament. One unique characteristic common to all the organizations 
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considered in this study is that unlike ’pure’ or ‘classic’ forms of public organizations such as 
ministries and the civil service (Baarspul and Wilderom, 2011), these government corporations 
and agencies/authorities engage in revenue-yielding businesses (though not-for-profit).  
 The selection of multiple informants per organization per decision-type was meant to 
minimize bias as well as enhance the estimation of aggregate scores that fairly approximate the 
diversity of opinion about the issue being considered. From a total of 600 questionnaires 
distributed, 366 were retrieved (representing a response rate of 61%). The retrieval rate per 
organization range from 33.3% (5 of 15 participants) to 80% (12 of 15 participants) returning their 
completed questionnaire. The high response rate is attributed to many factors including the 
complete anonymization of responses (thus, assuring participants of their confidentiality) and a 
vigorous follow-up on participants to ensure timely completion of the survey instrument. Overall, 
however, only 341 responses were found usable for the analysis. 
Results and Findings 
 The Measurement Model 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to assess scale unidimensionality, reliability 
and validity. After the measurement model modification and improvement process, only forty-six 
(46) measurement items remained from the fifty-six (56) items that were used in the initial CFA 
model run. In all, ten (10) items were eliminated for either having low and insignificant loading 
on the respective constructs they are meant to measure, or for having unacceptably high 
standardized residual score values as suggested by Schumacker and Lomax (2016). The resultant 
measurement model fit indices (RMSEA=0.018, GFI=0.890, AGFI=0.87, CFI=0.990, TLI=0.988) 
and individual items factor loadings (factor loadings range from 0.623 to 0.99) indicate that the 
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theoretical measurement model is satisfactory (Schumacker & Lomax, 2016; Hair, Black, Babin 
& Anderson, 2010). 
The average variance extracted (AVE) and composite construct reliability (CR) of each 
sub-scale was computed by applying the approach suggested by Fornell & Larcker (1981). From 
the results in Appendices B-D: (i) the AVE values are lower than the respective CR values and 
both the AVE and CR are above the recommended thresholds of 0.5 and 0.7 respectively; (ii) the 
maximum shared variance (MSV) and average shared variance (ASV) values are both lower than 
their respective AVE values, and the AVE for each construct is comparatively higher than the 
squared inter-construct correlation (SIC) coefficients for the respective constructs. Taking the 
above measurement model statistics into consideration, this study’s measures are internally 
consistent, and all the scales are unidimensional and valid with respect to discriminant and 
convergent validity (Blunch, 2005; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
The Structural Model 
The structural model was tested after validating the measurement model. In this model, 
government policies (GOV_P), party politics (PAT_P), social ties (SOCT), time pressure 
(TM_P), instrumental ethical work climates (IN_EC), rules ethical work climates (RL_EC), 
position (POSTN), self-enhancement personal values (EPVL), self-transcendent personal values 
(TPVL) and experience (EXPR) are the variables explaining strategic supplier selection 
decisions (SUP_DEC). SUP_DEC is also hypothesized to explain organizational performance 
(PERFM) while requisite funding (FUNDS) serves as the control variable on both SUP_DEC 
and PERFM. Because of the complex nature of the model, structural equation modeling (SEM) 
techniques based on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in AMOS were used to test the 
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structural model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2016). More so, this study satisfies SEM requirements 
in terms of data normality and sample size (Soper, 2017; Westland, 2010; Hair et al., 2011; 
Blunch, 2005). 
  The results of the adjusted model are displayed in Table 1 and as Figure 2 below. While 
Table 1 shows all the hypothesized relationships and their respective standardized estimators and 
critical ratios (t-values), Figure 2 displays the updated model alongside the relevant goodness-of-
fit indices (X2, GFI, AGFI, NFI, CFI, TLI and RMSEA). All the structural model fit indices are 
within acceptable cut-off limits, indicating that the model is satisfactory (Blunch, 2005). 
 The result shows that experience, party politics, social ties, instrumental ethical work 
climates and government buying policies causally explain strategic supplier selection decision 
(p<0.01). The remaining explanatory variables (time pressure, self-enhancement personal values, 
self-transcendent personal values, position, and rules ethical work climates) have critical ratio 
values less than 1.96, indicating that their relationship with strategic supplier selection decision is 
non-significant. Similarly, the hypothesized relationship between supplier selection decision and 
performance was found to be non-significant (p>0.05). In terms of the relative importance of the 
examined antecedents (see the relative beta weight rankings in Table 2 below), government policy 
(with a score of 0.530) is the most important, followed by social ties (0.250) and party politics 
(0.226) respectively. Following in descending order of importance after government policy, social 
ties and party politics are: experience (0.131), instrumental ethical work climates (0.125), rules 
ethical work climates (0.054), self-enhancement personal values (0.052), position (0.047), self-
transcendent personal values (0.016), and time pressure (-0.047). These results and their 
implication for theory and practice are discussed in the proceeding sections. 
25 
ANTECEDENTS OF SUPPLIER SELECTION DECISIONS 
 
 
Table 1: Regression weights and correlations (path estimates) for hypotheses testing  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SUP_DEC <--- EXPR .101 .028 3.618 *** 
SUP_DEC <--- TM_P -.039 .033 -1.200 .230 
SUP_DEC <--- PAT_P .150 .025 5.960 *** 
SUP_DEC <--- SOCT .208 .034 6.123 *** 
SUP_DEC <--- TPVLS .010 .034 .301 .763 
SUP_DEC <--- FUNDS .100 .037 2.684 .007 
SUP_DEC <--- POSTN .029 .022 1.354 .176 
SUP_DEC <--- GOV_P .344 .035 9.924 *** 
SUP_DEC <--- IN_EC .056 .016 3.504 *** 
SUP_DEC <--- EPVLS .029 .033 .903 .367 
SUP_DEC <--- RL_EC .059 .042 1.417 .157 
PERFM <--- FUNDS .895 .089 10.037 *** 
PERFM <--- SUP_DEC .007 .062 .107 .915 
GOV_P <--> RL_EC .044 .020 2.206 .027 
PAT_P <--> SOCT .146 .029 5.020 *** 
POSTN <--> PAT_P .081 .033 2.442 .015 
PAT_P <--> RL_EC .038 .020 1.885 .059 
PAT_P <--> IN_EC .048 .023 2.107 .031 
IN_EC <--> EPVLS .221 .048 4.632 *** 
TM_P <--> EPVLS -.043 .025 -1.730 .084 
EXPR <--> TM_P -.023 .023 -1.012 .311 
 
Table 2: Standardized rankings of supplier selection antecedents 
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Discussion of Findings. 
Consistent with several suggestions in the literature (e.g., Nijboer et al., 2017; Ambaw & 
Telgen, 2017; Mbago et al., 2016; Akenroye, 2013; Achua, 2011; Qiao et al., 2009; Erridge, 2005) 
this study’s result confirms that government policy requirements are an important determinant of 
strategic supplier selection decision in public sector organizations (H1).  In the same vein, the 
significant positive relationship observed between government policies and rules ethical work 
Figure 2:  Adjusted model and hypotheses 
Note: The lines with single-headed arrows indicate causal-explanatory 
relationships. Double-headed arrows indicate hypothesized correlations 
between independent variables. Broken lines, whether on single- or 
double-headed arrows indicate significant relationships, while thick 
continuous lines depict hypotheses that were confirmed. 
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climates (H1b) suggests that more regulations are associated with a greater awareness that decisions 
are constrained by a pervasive set of rules which may sometimes be as complex as they are 
complicated. This may explain the ‘bureaucratic bottlenecks’, ‘red tape’ and frustrations often 
encountered when doing business with public sector organizations (Woodside et al., 2012; Achua, 
2011; Kennedy & Cannon, 2004).  
Our findings also show that public sector organizational decision makers take the interests 
of external political stakeholders and government officials into consideration when making 
important strategic decisions (H2) This is hardly surprising given the proximate and dependence 
relationship that exists between political-governmental systems and government-owned 
organizations (Roman, 2017; Khemakhem & Dicko, 2013; You & Du, 2013: Sun et al., 2011). To 
further buttress this finding, the relationship between party politics, on the one hand, and the 
personal and intra/inter-organizational relationships cultivated/maintained by important 
organizational actors (H2a), appointment to strategic decision making positions (H2b), and the 
organization-wide perception that organizational decisions allow for the accommodation of 
selfish/parochial interests (H2d), on the other hand, are positive and significant, thus indicating that 
organizational actors rely on, and consciously seek mutually beneficial relationships with, 
important government officials with a view to securing or enhancing their decision-making 
leverage and personal interests. This results also shows that the overwhelming role of party politics 
in both the decision of who to select and who does the final selection (given the pervasive negative 
influence of party politics in organizational processes) creates an environment where decisions 
pivot more on personal and parochial interests than on public interests. These results are generally 
consistent with literature which suggest that public sector procurement is influenced by politics 
(Roman, 2014).  
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Contrary to expectation, our data did not show that organizational actors’ perception that 
decisions are (and ought to be guided) by a pervasive set of rules is neutralized or negated by the 
undue influence of party politics (H2c), thus suggesting that there is a strong perception that things 
are still being done by the rules. Though surprising, this result is not implausible. This finding 
appears to show the fact that more and more rules and regulations are being put in place to ensure 
equity, fairness and accountability in government transactions (Achua, 2011; Akenroye, 2013; 
Nwakibinga & Buvik, 2013; Sun et al., 2011; Qiao et al., 2009), and that employees are very much 
aware of this. Indeed, public sector organizations are often described as full of bureaucratic red 
tape because of the many rules that guide their operations (Woodside et al., 2012; Lindskog et al., 
2010). Hence, there is no shortage of rules in the public sector to mitigate the perceived negative 
undue influence of party politics. Therefore, this result suggests that although many rules exist to 
constrain decision-makers, these rules are not effective enough (or are not enforced enough) to 
match the pervasive incursion of party politics. This may particularly be the case in Nigeria which 
“has a poor history of effectively implementing statutes and policies” and where procurement 
contract award criteria are “only protected by the goodwill of the government in power at any 
given time.” (Achua, 2011, p.327). 
This study’s data found no support for the hypothesis that higher time pressure will 
inversely influence supplier selection decisions (H3), thus suggesting that decision-makers are not 
bothered by an insufficiency of time or information when making important decisions. Though 
inconsistent with the results of some previous studies (see Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-
Cillan, 2004), this result is much in line with Africans’ polychromic orientation and economic 
value for time, which shows that people generally do not consider time as a resource to be planned 
and properly managed (Kotabe and Helsen, 2001). For this reason, public sector decision-makers 
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may act like they have all the time in the world, and nobody is bothered when time-bound public 
contracts are not executed fully within budgeted resources. This interpretation, which may also 
explain the spate of abandoned public projects and poor infrastructural development in most 
African countries, is supported by the studies of DeVoe and Pfeffer (2011, p.1397) where they 
conclude that “the more valuable time becomes, the more reluctant people are to waste it; thus, 
they feel both greater pressure and greater anxiety”. 
Consistent with our prior expectation as well as with previous studies (e.g., Gonzalez et 
al., 2014; Kwon & Adler, 2014; Sheng et al., 2011; Lin, 2008), our data supports the hypothesis 
that the multiple and boundary-spanning personal informal relationships nurtured by 
organizational decision-makers with entities within and outside the organization provide them with 
leverage in influencing strategic purchase decisions (H4), thus suggesting that organizational 
actors can increase their power to influence strategic organizational outcomes by aligning 
themselves (both at the formal and informal levels) with key stakeholders within and outside the 
organizations. 
Our results also indicate that the relationship between the CEO’s structural position and 
influence in strategic supplier selection decision (H5) is not significant. This result, which is 
contrary to our expectation, implies that being in a strategic position (as the CEO’s is) in an 
organization’s TMT is important and necessary if an individual is to have a say in organizational 
strategic processes, but such a position is not sufficient to guarantee that one can always influence 
all strategic decisions all the time. Though surprising, this finding makes more sense when one 
considers the fact that organizational buying decision is essentially a ‘group-level’ or ‘joint 
decision’ phenomenon where choices are ‘influenced’ by several individuals from several 
departments who constitute the organization’s buying center (Hutt & Speh, 2013; Johnston & 
30 
ANTECEDENTS OF SUPPLIER SELECTION DECISIONS 
 
 
Schandler, 2012; Garrido-Samaniego & Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004). Typically, organizational 
decision processes for buying important assets (including the engagement of contractors) involve 
the contributions of ‘experts’ and other important stakeholders from both within and outside the 
organization.  
Our data also confirm the existence of a positive and significant relationship between 
instrumental ethical work climates and supplier selection decisions (H6-i), implying that public 
sector employees generally believe that self-seeking and parochial interests play a prominent role 
during supplier selection. In addition, the expected positive and significant relationship between 
rules ethical work climates and strategic supplier selection decisions (H6-ii) was refuted by our 
data, indicating that there is a general belief that extant buying rules and regulations are not being 
strictly adhered to during supplier selection decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that 
the preponderance of instrumental ethical climates in public sector establishments reduces the 
importance of rules and regulations during strategic supplier selection decisions. That is, although 
there is no shortage of rules and regulations to guide decision-making, egoistic and parochial self-
satisfying tendencies accentuated by external socio-political interests often dictate the outcome.  
Furthermore, the positive and significant relationship found between instrumental ethical 
work climates and self-enhancement personal values (H6a) suggest that organizations which harbor 
instrumental ethical climates are likely to also attract and harbor employees whose personal value 
orientations gravitate towards self-enhancement and self-gratifying virtues. In other words, some 
organizational practices engender environments that permit the expression of parochial and 
egoistic tendencies without employees feeling the moral burden of having done something wrong. 
This interpretation is consistent with Roman’s (2014) findings which show that procurement 
officers in government-owned establishments perceive certain decisions as ‘correct’ and 
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acceptable within the context of their work environment, yet those officers reject or condemn such 
decisional motivations as they pertain to their private lives. 
The hypothesis that both self-enhancement and self-transcendent personal values will be 
significantly and positively associated with supplier selection decisions (H7) was not supported. 
This shows that neither the individual decision-makers’ desire (motivation) to be successful and 
respected (recognized) as competent achievers and ambitious goal-getters nor their concern for the 
welfare of the public considerably influence who gets selected as the supplier. An explanation for 
these results may be provided by the decision context. Given the ‘joint’ nature of most 
organizational buying decisions (Hutt & Speh, 2013; Johnston & Schandler, 2012; Garrido-
Samaniego & Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004; Wright, 2004), it is very likely that different value types may 
come to play at different stages in the buying decision process. Equally, some individuals can 
exhibit varying degrees of different value types at different stages of the purchase decision cycle 
because of their boundary-spanning positions in the organization. This is consistent with 
Rockeach’s finding cited by Fu et al. (2010, p.228) which observes that “all men everywhere 
possess the same values, but to different degrees.” This also suggest that the possession or 
expression of certain forms of values (for example, pro-social values) does not automatically 
translate to the possession of zero levels of other forms of values; the vicissitudes of context 
(opportunity, time, place, pressure, etc.) can give expression to different types of values in the 
same individual (Roman, 2014). Also, consistent with Roman’s (2014) ‘Purist-Broker’ value 
model, our study shows that self-seeking values (with a standardized beta score of 0.056) relatively 
predominate over self-transcendent and pro-social considerations (beta value=0.016) during 
supplier selection decisions.   
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This study’s data also did not support the hypothesis that situations of higher time pressure 
will be associated with the demonstration of greater self-enhancement tendencies and behaviors 
by decision-makers (H7a), thus suggesting that public sector decision-makers put forward less and 
less self-serving values and tendencies as the pressure to reach a decision quickly grows higher. 
Though unexpected, this finding is not implausible. Some decisions are so strategic and important 
that they leave no room for mistakes on the part of the decision-makers. The implications of some 
failed decisions are such that entire governments may be brought down and even political 
‘godfathers’ may be unable to help their protégés. Since most individuals, like organizations, are 
risk-averse, they may likely curtail their personal ambitions by consulting ‘experts’ (thus 
expressing other value types which favor consultations, conformity, universalism, preservation of 
status quo, etc.). An alternative explanation may be that when time is short (i.e., pressure is high) 
and there is no option for choice deferral, the decision stakes become high and decision-makers 
set aside their personal ambitions and use objective heuristics to reach decisions quickly. When 
the pressure is low, decision-makers do not feel the need to reach a decision quickly. Thus, they 
have ample time to consider which options serve their interests better. Hence, it appears that 
decision-makers only get the opportunity to act on their values when the pressure/stake is low. 
This interpretation is in line with McGuire et al.’s (2008, p.345) findings which suggest that 
“managers may be less likely to give expression to their personal values” when the stakes are high. 
Similarly, Connor and Becker (2003, p.159) point out that “decisions made based on [a] greater 
amount of information, and under [a] lesser time constraint, were more in keeping with the 
individual’s values.”  
This study provides additional evidence in support of the importance of the experience of 
decision makers in determining their level of influence in strategic supplier selection decisions 
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(H8), consistent with previous studies (Balaz et al., 2014; Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-
Cillan, 2004; Dawes et al., 1992; Perkins and Rao, 1990; Kobhi, 1989). This result shows that 
decision-makers’ cumulative learning (in terms of their track records, familiarity with the issues 
and requirements surrounding the decision types at hand, competencies, etc.) positively and 
significantly determine participation and influence during the selection decisions for important 
suppliers. The result also implies that on occasions where organizations appear not to have 
personnel with the requisite experience to assess impending decisions, experts may be consulted 
to help top management reach the required decisions. 
However, the hypothesis that highly experienced decision-makers will feel less perturbed 
by time-pressured conditions during strategic decisions (H8a) was not supported by our data. A 
possible explanation for this might be that although decision-makers require higher levels of 
cumulative knowledge to cope with time-pressured conditions during important decisions, their 
coping capacity depends on the level of fit between their core competencies and the decision 
requirements at hand. What this means is that there are conditions of time pressure when 
experience may not be so useful (i.e., less effective) in defusing or deflecting pressures. This view 
is in consonance with studies which observe that the importance of experience is decision-specific, 
depending on the type of purchase and core expertise required for such decisions (Garrido-
Samaniego & Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004; Kobhi,1989).  
 Also, not supported by our data is the hypothesis that the supplier selection choices public 
sector organizations make will substantially reflect on their performance in terms of attaining set 
objectives for those choices (H9), thus implying that relative to other factors (such as funding), 
suppliers selected are only marginally important in explaining (influencing) public sector 
organizational performance. A possible explanation for this might be that, rather than who is 
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selected as final supplier per se, such internal and external factors as a lack of strategic planning, 
inadequate funding, corruption in public procurement, political interference, bureaucratic red tape, 
etc., are more critical in determining organizational performance. Be that as it may, this result calls 
for further empirical investigation. 
Conclusions and Limitations. 
Conclusions. 
 Having analyzed the results, we now consider some of the major conclusions and 
implications of the findings. 
 Compliance with government buying policies, though very important, is only a minimum; 
to enhance their chance of being selected, prospective suppliers must make efforts to 
develop both business and personal connections with important stakeholders within the 
buying organizations as well as with important politicians and government officials. 
 The strong influence of party politics in supplier selection decisions and the significant 
shared perception that public sector work environments promote self-gratifying tendencies 
are indicators that rules play a secondary (unimportant) role during decision processes, 
despite their proliferation in public sector organizations. 
 Organizational actors’ experience with the buying process is very important during 
strategic supplier selection decisions. To increase their chances of being selected, 
prospective suppliers must reach out to experienced members of the buying center, not just 
the CEO alone. This is because the CEO position is not critically important in determining 
who gets selected during joint decision situations. 
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 There is a strong shared perception that public sector supplier selection decisions are made 
under conditions that promote parochial and self-seeking goals, without much regards for 
the interest of the public. However, there was no evidence to suggest that any one decision-
maker's value orientation causally determines group decision outcomes. 
 Time pressure is not an important determinant of supplier decision in the Nigerian public 
sector, probably because decision-makers operate under a polychromic sense of time (and 
thus fail to see the long-term effects of their current decisions). 
 It does not matter much to public sector performance who is given a contract; rather, 
what matters is the interplay of other factors such as timely funding availability. The non-
performance of government contractors may be attributed more to other factors 
(including inadequate financing, corruption, weak enforcement of regulations and fiscal 
irresponsibility, etc.) than to the choice of suppliers per se.  
Limitations 
 Further studies are needed to confirm or refute the results/conclusions of this study. Some 
relevant variables have been omitted in our model; thus, further studies incorporating such 
variables as culture, trust, corruption, religiosity, and ethnicity may improve the explanatory and 
descriptive capacity of the model. Furthermore, the non-specification of a product/service type 
may present a challenge for generalization, given that these antecedents may apply differently in 
diverse strategic buying decision situations (Garrido-Samaniego and Gutierrez-Cillan, 2004; 
Dawes, et al., 1998; Kobhi, 1989). We suggest that future research may specify whether the 
decision pertains to service/consultancy or works/construction contracts. Finally, the questionnaire 
format used may present issues of common method bias. Although we took adequate measures to 
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minimize this, future research may use objective measures of performance or incorporate multiple 
sources/types of data in their analysis. 
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Appendix A: Measurement Items and their Codes 
Questionnaire items description  Codes 
Your Gender GENDER 
Your Age AGE 
Which of the following best describe your department DEPARTMENT 
How long have you beeg in your current position? TENURE 
Has this organization engaged in the purchase of assets (such as the 
purchase of capital equipment or contracting for important project, etc.) 
within the past 3-5 years of which you are aware? 
AWARENESS 
Government policies GOP, GOV_P 
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This organization complies with all the buying regulations of both the 
federal and state governments. 
GOP1 
This organization considers only suppliers who comply with both 
domestic and national procurement requirements. 
GOP2 
This organization is always guided by the government policy requirements 
of ‘due process’ and ‘local content’ when making supplier selection. 
GOP3 
In this organization, the adherence to government rules and regulations is 
very important. 
GOP4 
Party Politics PAP, PAT_P 
Government officials are important stakeholders in the survival of this 
organization. 
PAP1 
The ruling party has a say in the appointment of CEO in this organization PAP2 
This organization often comes under pressure to adjust its internal buying 
policies to accommodate the preferences of important stakeholders in the 
ruling party 
PAP3 
Political parties sometimes exert undue pressure when pursuing their 
interest. 
PAP4 
The interest of external political stakeholders is often taken into 
consideration during important purchase decisions 
PAP5 
Time Pressure TMP, TM_P 
The CEO often takes his/her time to consider information and options 
when making decisions; he/she is usually not worried by the pressure to 
reach a decision quickly. 
TMP1 
The CEO always feels the pressure to reach a decision quickly when 
making important decisions. 
TMP2 
Time is not so much an important factor when making decision; there is 
usually no need to rush decision 
TMP3 
Social Ties SOT, SOCT 
The CEO in this organization has built good connections with other 
members of the top management team (TMT) 
SOT1 
The CEO in this organization has good personal relationships with 
officials at various levels of government 
SOT2 
So far, this organization’s relationship with regional government officials 
has been in good shape 
SOT3 
The CEO of this organization has good friendly relationship with people 
both within and outside this organization, including business men, 
professional associates, religious and social groups, etc. 
SOT4 
The CEO of this organization considers it important to have informal 
contacts and interactions with people from all walks of life 
SOT5 
The CEO of this organization considers it important to have good 
connections with managers in other organizations 
SOT6 
The CEO in this organization has good connections with officials in 
regulatory authorities, such as ministries and house of assemblies, etc. 
SOT7 
Experience EXP, EXPR 
The CEO is knowledgeable about the organization’s needs. EXP1 
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The CEO has the competence to assess the various options available to the 
organization. 
EXP2 
The CEO is familiar with the requirements for making important/strategic 
decisions in this organization 
EXP3 
It matters to this organization a lot that the CEO has the requisite 
experience. 
EXP4 
The CEO has the track records and expertise in making important 
decisions. 
EXP5 
Position POST, POSTN 
Relative to other positions in the organization’s TMT, the CEO’s position 
is much more important when it comes to making important purchase 
decisions. 
POST1 
One’s formal rank or level in the organizational hierarchy is very 
important. 
POST2 
The CEO’s position in the organizational hierarchy accords him/her ease 
of access and influence with important stakeholders both within and 
outside this organization 
POST3 
Instrumental ethical work climate IN_EC, INEC 
In this organization, people are mostly out for themselves ECI1 
In this organization, people protect their own interest above other 
considerations 
ECI2 
People are expected to do anything to further the organization’s interest ECI3 
There is no room for one’s own personal morals and ethics in this 
organization 
ECI5 
In this organization, decision-makers do generally factor in their personal 
and selfish interest when making decisions. 
ECI6 
Rules ethical work climate RL_EC, RLEC 
In this organization, the first consideration is whether decisions violate 
any law or professional standards. 
ECR10 
In this organization, it is very important for people to follow laid down 
rules and regulations 
ECR11 
In this organization, people are expected to comply with the law and 
professional standards above other considerations 
ECR12 
Supplier selection decision SUP_DEC, 
SUPL 
The criteria for evaluating and selecting suppliers in this organization are 
clear enough 
SSD1 
This organization attaches great importance to the selection of suppliers 
during strategic purchases 
SSD2 
Given the list of pre-qualified vendors, the decision as to who is finally 
selected does not matter a lot 
SSD3 
Self-enhancement personal values EPVLS 
It is very important to the CEO that people recognize his/her capabilities 
and competence 
PVE1 
The CEO likes to be in charge and tell people what to do. He/she wants 
people to do what he/she says 
PVE6 
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For the CEO, being successful is important. He/she likes to impress other 
people and want people to recognize his/her 
PVE7 
For the CEO, being rich is important. He/she loves to have a lot of money 
and expensive things 
PVE9 
The CEO is ambitious. He/she likes showing people how capable he/she is PVE10 
The CEO likes enjoying himself/herself. He/she likes to ‘spoil’ 
himself/herself a little 
PVE11 
For the CEO, getting ahead in life is very important. He/she strives to do 
better than others 
PVE13 
The CEO always wants to be the one who makes the important decisions; 
he/she likes to be in the lead 
PVE15 
Self-transcendent personal values TPVLS 
The CEO believes that everyone in the world should be treated equally, 
that everyone should have equal opportunity in life 
PVT2 
It is very important for the CEO to help the people around him/her; He/she 
wants to care for other people 
PVT3 
The CEO strongly believes that people should care for nature and look 
after the environment 
PVT4 
The CEO listens to people who are different from him/her. Even when 
he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them 
PVT5 
For the CEO, it is important to be loyal to friends. He/she devotes 
himself/herself to people close to him/her 
PVT8 
The CEO treats everyone justly, even people he/she doesn’t know. It is 
important to him/her to protect the weak in society 
PVT12 
The CEO always forgives people who offend him/her; he tries to see what 
is good in them, and not to hold a grudge 
PVT14 
Perceived performance PERF, PERFM 
The selection of suppliers has implications for the organization (in terms 
of accomplishing projects within budgeted resources, organizational 
effectiveness, etc.) 
PERF1 
The suppliers selected by this organization have affected our capability to 
effectively deliver required services 
PERF2 
The suppliers selected have affected this organization’s performance in 
terms of cost savings and service delivery quality 
PERF3 
The selection of suppliers has influenced the performance of this 
organization in terms of achieving the purpose for which the decision was 
made 
PERF4 
Requisite funding FUNDS 
This organization depends heavily on government funding FND1 
This organization’s asset purchase budget is seriously affected by funding 
availability 
FND2 
This organization can survive without government funding FND3 
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Appendix B: Inter-items correlation with square roots of AVE on the diagonal 
 GOP PAP TMP SOT EXP POST INEC 
RLE
C 
TPV
L 
EPV
L 
FUN
D 
PER
F 
SUP
L 
GOP 
0.85
9                         
PAP 
0.34
7 
0.87
6                       
TMP 
0.05
5 
0.00
7 0.748                     
SOT 
0.42
5 
0.32
8 0.003 
0.78
8                   
EXP 
0.30
3 
0.16
4 
-
0.038 
0.17
7 0.934                 
POST 
0.26
7 
0.18
4 0.001 
0.21
0 0.266 0.860               
INEC 
0.00
2 
0.08
7 
-
0.237 
0.12
9 
-
0.112 0.018 0.822             
RLE
C 
0.16
2 
0.09
8 0.273 
0.09
9 0.036 0.040 
-
0.234 0.788           
TPVL 
0.06
0 
0.03
5 
-
0.096 
0.14
8 0.006 0.105 0.115 -0.062 0.920         
EPVL 
0.00
1 
0.07
6 
-
0.202 
0.10
9 
-
0.026 
-
0.025 0.335 -0.135 0.591 0.734       
FUN
D 
0.13
7 
0.00
9 0.111 
0.14
5 0.070 0.057 
-
0.068 0.059 0.080 0.056 0.756     
PERF 
0.10
0 
0.02
2 0.091 
0.06
8 0.064 0.007 0.001 0.037 0.032 0.086 0.572 0.798   
SUPL 
0.69
6 
0.48
4 
-
0.002 
0.52
2 0.386 0.334 0.152 0.116 0.135 0.164 0.171 0.124 0.869 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Table Of reliability and validity coefficients 
  CR AVE MSV ASV 
GOP 0.9173 0.7386 0.4894 0.0841 
PAP 0.9293 0.7678 0.2343 0.0457 
TMP 0.7911 0.5592 0.0745 0.0171 
SOT 0.8649 0.6212 0.2725 0.0601 
EXP 0.8816 0.8725 0.1498 0.033 
POST 0.894 0.7393 0.1116 0.0285 
INEC 0.8979 0.6921 0.1122 0.0251 
RLEC 0.8308 0.6213 0.0745 0.0179 
TPVL 0.9565 0.846 0.3493 0.0366 
EPVL 0.8204 0.5392 0.3493 0.0479 
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FUND 0.7996 0.5711 0.326 0.0362 
PERF 0.8393 0.6367 0.326 0.0315 
SUPL 0.9015 0.7549 0.4844 0.1149 
 
Appendix D: Construct items loadings 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
EXP5 <--- EXPR 1.000    
EXP4 <--- EXPR .872 .063 13.822 *** 
EXP2 <--- EXPR .919 .060 15.353 *** 
EXP1 <--- EXPR 1.271 .065 19.663 *** 
POST3 <--- POSTN .818 .049 16.744 *** 
POST2 <--- POSTN 1.000    
POST1 <--- POSTN 1.155 .057 20.420 *** 
GOP1 <--- GOV_P 1.000    
GOP2 <--- GOV_P .817 .049 16.517 *** 
GOP3 <--- GOV_P .699 .063 11.148 *** 
GOP4 <--- GOV_P 1.005 .057 17.668 *** 
PAP4 <--- PAT_P .925 .047 19.716 *** 
PAP3 <--- PAT_P 1.133 .044 25.724 *** 
PAP2 <--- PAT_P .938 .048 19.358 *** 
PAP1 <--- PAT_P 1.000    
SOT7 <--- SOCT 1.000    
SOT3 <--- SOCT .969 .077 12.624 *** 
SOT2 <--- SOCT 1.082 .085 12.758 *** 
SOT1 <--- SOCT 1.545 .099 15.552 *** 
ECI1 <--- IN_EC 1.000    
ECI2 <--- IN_EC .627 .047 13.488 *** 
ECI3 <--- IN_EC .928 .036 25.508 *** 
ECI5 <--- IN_EC .935 .040 23.110 *** 
TMP2 <--- TM_P 1.000    
TMP1 <--- TM_P 1.051 .091 11.566 *** 
TMP3 <--- TM_P .958 .087 11.025 *** 
PVT8 <--- TPVLS 1.000    
PVT4 <--- TPVLS .987 .035 28.260 *** 
PVT3 <--- TPVLS .908 .033 27.158 *** 
PVT2 <--- TPVLS 1.000 .030 33.348 *** 
PVE9 <--- EPVLS 1.000    
PVE10 <--- EPVLS .710 .056 12.648 *** 
PVE11 <--- EPVLS .734 .058 12.571 *** 
PVE13 <--- EPVLS .793 .054 14.676 *** 
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   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SSD1 <--- SUP_DEC 1.000    
SSD2 <--- SUP_DEC 1.114 .049 22.809 *** 
SSD3 <--- SUP_DEC .978 .056 17.401 *** 
PERF1 <--- PERFM 1.000    
PERF2 <--- PERFM .919 .059 15.546 *** 
PERF3 <--- PERFM .802 .058 13.945 *** 
ECR10 <--- RL_EC 1.000    
ECR11 <--- RL_EC 1.101 .082 13.379 *** 
ECR12 <--- RL_EC 1.066 .082 12.991 *** 
FND3 <--- FUNDS 1.000    
FND2 <--- FUNDS .995 .083 12.028 *** 
FND1 <--- FUNDS .929 .074 12.580 *** 
 
Notes: GOP=GOV_P=Government Policies 
PAP=PAT_P=Party Politics 
TMP=TM_P=Time Pressure 
SOT=SOCT=Social Ties 
EXP=EXPR= Personal Experience 
POST=POSTN=CEO’s Position 
INEC=IN_EC=Instrumental Ethical Work Climates 
RLEC=RL_EC=Rules Ethical Work Climates 
TPVL=TPVLS=Self-Transcendent Personal Values 
EPVLEPVLS=Self-Enhancement Personal Values 
FUND=FUNDS=Requisite Funding 
SUPL=SUP_DEC=Supplier Selection Decision 
PERF=PERFM=Perceived Performance 
